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In the wake of 2008’s great financial crash, 
pundits rushed to proclaim that a new era was at 
hand. “Another ideological god has failed,” intoned 
Martin Wolf, longtime columnist for the Financial 
Times. “The assumptions that ruled policy and politics 
over three decades suddenly look as outdated as 
revolutionary socialism.”1 “The fall of Wall Street,” 
said Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz, 
“is for market fundamentalism what the fall of the 
Berlin Wall was for communism—it tells the world 
that this way of economic organization turns out not 
to be sustainable.”2 The Washington Post ran a big 
think piece with the headline, “The End of American 
Capitalism?”3 While the Post raised the question, 
Newsweek provided the answer in a cover story 
entitled, “We Are All Socialists Now.”4 
According to this line of thinking, the spectacular 
implosion of America’s high-flying financial system 
signaled the beginning of a worldwide shift in political 
economy—away from the generation-long trend 
toward freer, more competitive markets and toward 
greater reliance on government mandates and controls. 
Just as the Great Depression supposedly discredited 
“laissez faire” and catalyzed the turn toward more 
interventionist government, so the Great Recession 
would do likewise and end the “neoliberal” era 
of market-oriented reforms. Soon after the 2008 
presidential election, Time drew this parallel with the 
1930s by putting Barack Obama on the cover dressed 
as FDR, complete with fedora, eyeglasses, and cigarette 
in holder rising jauntily from a broad grin. “The New 
New Deal,” the caption read.5 
Suffice it to say that things look rather different 
today. In the United States, the political momentum for 
more activist government has been halted recently by 
a ferocious political backlash. Meanwhile, in the rest of 
the world, the most dramatic policy responses provoked 
by the Great Recession have been in the direction of 
scaling back government, not expanding it. Specifically, 
fiscal crises in Iceland, Greece, and Ireland—and worries 
about further shoes to drop in Spain, Portugal, and 
elsewhere—have precipitated a continent-wide austerity 
drive, cutting government salaries and curtailing social 
welfare benefits. A major retrenchment in the European 
welfare state seems unavoidable.
It is true that the financial panic did precipitate, 
in the United States and elsewhere, a wave of bailouts 
and countercyclical spending packages. Yet these were 
emergency measures, temporary expedients designed to 
address the exigencies of the crisis rather than establish 
some permanent redefinition of government’s role. Two 
years and counting since the crash of 2008, there is 
simply no indication that some new, more government-
centric model of economic policy is emerging to 
supplant the pragmatic neoliberal paradigm that has 
reigned for the past three decades.
So, what happened? Why did the crystal ball 
gazers get things so wrong? It turns out their 
predictions were based on a serious misunderstanding 
of what was going on. Yes, there was a spectacular 
failure in financial markets—that is, in one of the most 
two years and counting since the crash of 2008, 
there is simply no indication that some new, more 
government-centric model of economic policy is 
emerging to supplant the pragmatic neoliberal paradigm 
that has reigned for the past three decades.
1. Martin Wolf, “Seeds of Its Own Destruction,” Financial Times, March 8, 2009.
2. Nathan Gardels, “Stiglitz: The Fall of Wall Street Is to Market Fundamentalism What the Fall of the Berlin Wall Was to Communism,” Huffington Post, September 16, 2008, http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-gardels/stiglitz-the-fall-of-wall_b_126911.html.
3. Anthony Faiola, “The End of American Capitalism?,” Washington Post, October 10, 2008.
4. Newsweek, February 16, 2009.
5. Time, November 24, 2008.
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heavily regulated and politicized industries in the whole 
economy. Although bankers and other market players 
surely made terrible and costly mistakes, so, too, did 
regulators, politicians, and central bankers. While the 
party lasted, almost everybody in both the private and 
public sectors was confident that risks were being well 
managed and the system was fundamentally sound. It 
turns out, of course, that almost everybody was wrong.
With so much blame to go around, the facts just 
don’t lend themselves to a simplistic morality play 
about greedy, short-sighted markets versus wise and 
beneficent public servants. However obvious it is now 
that new rules for the financial sector are needed, it’s 
anything but clear that simply increasing government 
oversight authority will be a step in the right direction. 
What’s needed isn’t necessarily more rules or fewer 
rules, but better ones.
Meanwhile, it is a crude non sequitur to leap 
from woes in one sector to an indictment of economic 
policies across the board. Recent decades have seen 
sweeping liberalization of a whole host of markets 
besides finance—not only in America, but around the 
world, as well. Why would any of this be called into 
question because of the current crisis? Did the bursting 
of the housing bubble somehow demonstrate that U.S. 
airline deregulation was a mistake? How about the 
breakup of Ma Bell? Or the privatization of European 
steelmakers? Or the worldwide fall in import tariffs? 
Should Latin America have been content with chronic 
fiscal crises and inflation? Are the hundreds of millions 
liberated from poverty by the opening of China’s 
economy just a mirage? 
Over the past generation, the dominant movement 
in world economic policy has been in the direction of 
greater reliance on private-sector entrepreneurship6 and 
market competition. First, the grand ideological struggle 
between capitalism and socialism ended in decisive 
victory for the former. In the space of just a few years, 
the socialist model of comprehensive central planning—
once widely embraced as the path to a better, richer, 
fairer world—lost the vast majority of both its adherents 
and its subjects. Meanwhile, the large and varied house 
of capitalism has undergone extensive renovations that 
have made it, on the whole, considerably more market-
oriented. To use the typology employed by William 
Baumol, Robert Litan, and Carl Schramm, the trend 
has been away from “state-guided,” “oligarchic,” and 
“big-firm” capitalism—think heavy-handed industrial 
policy, cronyism, and corporatism—and in the direction 
of “entrepreneurial” capitalism with robust competition 
and incessant “creative destruction”7 (See Figure 1). 
Notwithstanding the tumultuous events of recent 
years, there are strong reasons for believing that 
this trend will continue into the foreseeable future. 
Powerful social forces are changing the very nature of 
economic growth, with the upshot being that growth 
now increasingly is dependent on new products, 
new production processes, new industries—and the 
new businesses that are the indispensable agents of 
such innovation. In other words, economic growth 
increasingly takes place at the technological frontier—
that is, it results from the development of new ideas as 
opposed to the application of existing knowledge.
Here in the United States and around the world, 
we have entered what might be called the era of 
“frontier economics.” Older, easier sources of growth 
are drying up and, as a result, the prospects for 
continued dynamism and prosperity hinge more than 
ever before on the pioneering entrepreneurial upstarts 
that explore and extend the technological frontier. As 
a consequence, the political imperative to maintain 
satisfactory economic performance is putting national 
economies under ongoing pressure to free up markets 
and knock down artificial barriers to competition—
in other words, to make their particular versions of 
capitalism more entrepreneurial. The purpose of this 
paper is to offer a general explanation of this trend and 
the social forces driving it.
6. A brief cautionary note on terminology: Not all entrepreneurship is created equal. What I am concerned with here is productive entrepreneurship, i.e., innovation and new firm 
formation. As William Baumol has noted, entrepreneurial activity can take unproductive forms, as well (e.g., rent-seeking and organized crime). Baumol argues that an important 
determinant of a country’s growth prospects is the allocation of entrepreneurial activity between productive and unproductive pursuits, which government policies and institutions 
influence through affecting the relative payoffs. See, most recently, William J. Baumol, The Microtheory of Innovative Entrepreneurship (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2010), pp. 152–171.
7. See William J. Baumol, Robert E. Litan, and Carl J. Schramm, Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, and the Economics of Growth and Prosperity (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2007).
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Uncertainty and 
competition
Here is the basic hypothesis: There is a ratchet effect 
in the relationship between economic development and 
economic freedom. Specifically, the richer and more 
advanced a country gets, the more economic freedom 
it needs for growth to continue. Even at the most 
basic level, poor countries need to develop successful 
market economies to grow rich. But, once countries 
become rich, they find themselves ever more dependent 
on unpredictable entrepreneurial innovation—and, 
therefore, on a broader range of well-functioning, 
competitive markets—for continued prosperity. 
Consequently, as countries develop, they come under 
increasing pressure to liberalize their markets to stave off 
deteriorating economic performance.
Let me make clear what exactly I’m claiming here. 
By economic freedom, I don’t mean laissez faire or the 
bare minimum of taxes and regulations. It’s true that, 
from an individual’s perspective, every tax interferes 
with her ability to spend her money as she wishes, 
and every rule and regulation hinders her freedom 
to buy, sell, and run her business. But the point here 
isn’t to look at things from one person’s perspective. 
Rather, the relevant question is whether the economic 
system considered as a whole is more or less free—in 
other words, the extent to which it is guided by the 
free play of competitive market forces. For present 
purposes at least, the term economic freedom refers to 
things like the freedom of new businesses to enter the 
marketplace, the freedom of struggling businesses to 
exit, the freedom of businesses to hire and fire workers, 
the freedom of prices to move up and down in response 
to supply and demand, and freedom from government 
intervention that takes the form of “picking winners 
and losers.”
Accordingly, economic freedom isn’t the same 
thing as small government.8 Governments don’t 
have to spend a lot of money to be oppressive. 
And, as the Nordic countries demonstrate, high 
levels of government spending can coexist with 
relatively robust economic freedom. Indeed, higher 
government spending can facilitate liberalization by 
allaying the concerns of (or, more cynically, buying off) 
constituencies that stand to lose from reform. And, 
likewise, liberalization can facilitate higher government 
spending by boosting growth and making bigger 
government more affordable.
8. The relationship between economic development and government spending thus is beyond the scope of this paper. For present purposes, suffice it to say that this relationship is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, as countries grow richer, the requirements of economic growth may create pressure for reducing taxes and, consequently, eliminating or restructuring 
government programs funded by those taxes. On the other hand, certain public goods that governments historically have played a major role in providing—basic scientific research 
and education, for example—become more important as advanced economies grow more dependent on innovation. Also, it is possible that, because growth benefits some more 
than others, new safety net programs may be needed to ensure that entrepreneurial capitalism remains politically sustainable.
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Government spending does have an indirect effect 
on economic freedom because, sooner or later, it has 
to be paid for with taxes. And high tax rates can blunt 
and distort incentives in damaging ways.9 So, the 
requirements of growth do impose constraints on how 
high spending, and taxes, can climb. Indeed, learning 
to live within those constraints is one of the biggest 
challenges currently facing the United States and other 
advanced countries. Nevertheless, it’s clear enough 
that economic freedom does not impose draconian 
restrictions on the size of government.
With that bit of throat-clearing out of the way, 
let’s return to the ratchet effect hypothesis. What’s the 
basis for the claim that economic development leads to 
greater dependence on markets for continued growth? 
To understand the underlying dynamics, it’s useful to 
begin with the insights of F. A. Hayek, the Nobel-Prize 
winning economist who was among the twentieth 
century’s most profound and influential theorists and 
defenders of competitive markets.
According to Hayek, the chief virtue of the market 
order is its fertility in discovering and applying socially 
useful information. First, the system of freely moving 
prices distills and communicates existing information 
about consumers’ relative preferences—information 
so widely dispersed, and so often tacit and ephemeral, 
that it could never be successfully imparted to or made 
use of by a central planner. In addition, what Hayek 
called the “discovery procedure” of market competition 
constantly is generating useful new information—
about new products, or product improvements, or 
new production techniques—through trial-and-error 
experimentation by competing enterprises and the 
feedback of profit and loss. In the end, the market order 
is an ingenious solution to the problem of economic 
uncertainty—about what people want and how best 
to give it to them. “Wherever the use of competition 
can be rationally justified,” wrote Hayek, “it is on the 
ground that we do not know in advance the facts that 
determine the actions of competitors.”10 
It follows, therefore, that the importance of 
competition strengthens as uncertainty deepens.11 If you 
already know that one chess player is a grandmaster 
and the other is a novice, there really isn’t much point 
in staging a match between them. But, if you have 
two comparably ranked players, the only way to really 
find out who is better is to let them play. Likewise, 
if you already have a pretty clear idea of which new 
investments and new industries are needed to spur 
economic growth and raise productivity and living 
standards, then to that extent, at least, you don’t need 
to rely on the discovery process of the marketplace. 
Government-directed allocation of resources can 
provide an adequate substitute. If, however, the path 
of economic progress is shrouded in uncertainty, 
there is no good substitute for the marketplace’s 
encouragement and vetting of rival approaches.
And, generally speaking at least, the richer a 
country gets, the more uncertain its economic future 
becomes. This is true because sustained economic 
development leads to the progressive exhaustion of 
growth’s “low-hanging fruit”—the most obvious and 
As the saying goes, nothing fails like success:  
Economic institutions and policies that deliver sustained 
growth eventually run up against diminishing returns.
9. See, e.g., William M. Gentry and R. Glenn Hubbard, “Tax Policy and Entrepreneurial Entry,” American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 2, May 2000, pp. 283–287; Edward C. 
Prescott, “Why Do Americans Work So Much More Than Europeans?” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Vol. 28, No. 1, July 2004, pp. 2–13.
10. F. A. Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery Procedure,” in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 
179 (emphasis in original).
11. For a more detailed treatment of this point, see Brink Lindsey, Against the Dead Hand: The Uncertain Struggle for Global Capitalism (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2002), 
pp. 38–60.
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easily accomplished opportunities for wealth creation.12 
First, continued growth becomes increasingly reliant 
on indigenous innovation, as opposed to expansion of 
existing activities and imitation of advances pioneered 
elsewhere. Furthermore, the innovation process 
becomes ever more unpredictable as affluence deepens 
and spreads and economies grow increasingly complex. 
Here, then, is the basic logic of the ratchet effect. 
Economic development deepens uncertainty, and 
greater uncertainty heightens the dependence of 
further development on wide-ranging and vigorous 
competition among rival approaches. As the saying 
goes, nothing fails like success: Economic institutions 
and policies that deliver sustained growth eventually 
run up against diminishing returns. At this point, 
countries come under increasing pressure: To keep 
growth and prosperity going, they need to reform their 
institutions and policies to make them more conducive 
to competition—that is, to make their economies more 
entrepreneurial. 
imitative versus  
innovative Growth
Let’s dive in now and examine the details of 
how this logic plays out. To begin with, it’s important 
to understand that economic growth—that is, the 
increasing value of exchanged goods and services—
comes in different forms. For present purposes, the key 
distinction is between growth as more of the same and 
growth as something new and different. Specifically, 
growth can come from capital accumulation, expansion 
and upgrading of the labor force, and adoption of 
ideas developed elsewhere; or it can come from 
innovation—that is, the development of new products 
and new production processes. The former, which I 
will call imitative growth, occurs within the existing 
technological frontier; the latter, or innovative growth, 
pushes that frontier outward.13 
When countries are poor and their economies 
operate well behind the technological frontier, 
opportunities for imitative growth are relatively 
plentiful. Consider the conditions that typically exist 
in a less-developed country before the process of 
sustained growth begins. First, high birth rates and high 
death rates are the norm, and thus the average age is 
quite young. Second, a relatively large segment of the 
population remains in the countryside and still earns its 
living the old-fashioned way, in small-scale agriculture. 
Third, most industries that do exist lag well behind 
prevailing world standards of best practices. Finally, 
education levels generally are low, as there is relatively 
modest demand for highly skilled workers.
The upside of their relative backwardness is 
that less-developed countries have an opportunity to 
experience accelerated “catch-up growth.” All they 
have to do is shift workers out of low-productivity 
farming and into modern, organized industry, and get 
their industries to adopt more-advanced production 
processes and organizational structures already 
developed elsewhere. Without much in the way 
of home-grown innovation, they can achieve rapid 
productivity growth and the fast-rising living standards 
that go with escalating GDP per capita. 
This growth then feeds on itself by boosting the 
inputs of physical and human capital, the two sources 
of imitative growth. Rising incomes increase the pool 
of savings available for investment, thus promoting 
capital accumulation and further growth; at the same 
time, emerging markets become better at attracting 
foreign capital. Additional labor also comes online as 
the takeoff in living standards ushers in the so-called 
“demographic transition”: a plunge in death rates 
followed by a gradual decline in birth rates. The result is 
a kind of turbo-charged growth in the labor force as the 
population simultaneously booms and ages. Meanwhile, 
labor quality also improves as investments in education 
lead to rising skill levels.
12. The concept of growth’s “low-hanging fruit,” and the contention that it is being progressively exhausted, has been popularized recently by economist Tyler Cowen. See Tyler 
Cowen, The Great Stagnation: How America Ate All the Low-Hanging Fruit of Modern History, Got Sick, and Will (Eventually) Feel Better (New York: Dutton Adult, 2011). In a 
curious coincidence, the original drafting of this paper, including the use of this specific term, predates my reading and the publication of The Great Stagnation.
13. The distinction drawn here between imitative and innovative growth is similar to the more-familiar distinction between extensive and intensive growth. Extensive growth refers 
to growth that results purely from increased inputs (i.e., capital and labor), while intensive growth comes from getting more output from a given level of inputs (i.e., productivity 
growth). While these two dyads are related closely, there are important differences. Although innovation is the ultimate source of productivity growth, for a given country at a 
given time it is by no means the only source. In particular, shifts of labor and capital from low-productivity to higher-productivity sectors (e.g., from agriculture to manufacturing) 
and adoption of foreign technologies are major sources of productivity growth in less-advanced countries, but neither requires indigenous innovation. Nevertheless, because of the 
ultimate connection between innovation and productivity growth, the terms extensive and intensive growth sometimes are used in the same sense that I am using imitative and 
innovative growth.
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All of these rich opportunities for imitative catch-
up growth make for a development process that is 
relatively predictable. Which is to say, policymakers 
in less-developed countries have a fairly clear idea of 
where future growth is going to come from. In effect, 
the example of more-advanced countries allows them 
to peek into the future and see the economic changes 
that need to be made.
For much of the twentieth century, the possibility 
of catch-up growth fostered the widespread belief that 
markets could be largely or completely dispensed with 
and, indeed, were an impediment to progress. In the 
end, though, the old statist orthodoxy in development 
economics proved badly mistaken. There’s no getting 
around the need for a vibrant market economy, which 
is why we have seen such dramatic moves toward 
liberalization in less-developed countries over the past 
few decades.
Fulfilling the requirements for catch-up growth 
mentioned above may sound simple, but the task still 
eludes all too many countries today. To develop modern 
industries capable of absorbing a large rural population, 
you need a business climate that is favorable for 
large-scale, long-term investments. How exactly this 
arises differs from country to country; what suffices in 
one place may not work somewhere else. Generally, 
though, we’re talking about things like civil peace; basic 
macroeconomic stability; avoidance of negative real 
interest rates (caused by a combination of high inflation 
and repressive interest-rate controls), which stifle the 
development of the financial sector; tolerable security of 
property rights (so investments don’t get expropriated 
as soon as they start paying off); manageable levels 
of taxation and regulation; and a business culture in 
which getting rich by selling a better or cheaper product 
is widely seen as a viable alternative to getting rich 
through government connections. 
Next, to facilitate the adoption of foreign best 
practices, you need to ensure that your country’s 
industries are constantly exposed to and tested 
by them. For one thing, that means encouraging 
foreign investment and doing what’s needed to 
make investors feel welcome. Even more important, 
you need to encourage the development of export 
industries. Historical experience teaches us that it’s far 
more important, in the early going, for a developing 
country’s industries to seek out competition abroad 
than to face it at home. Accordingly, even if domestic 
import-competing industries remain protected behind 
high tariff walls, exporters need to operate in a 
free-trade environment. And the best way to create 
that environment is by eliminating trade barriers on 
imported equipment and components that are needed 
for export production.
It’s clear, then, that less-developed countries 
need pro-market policies to achieve economic takeoff. 
Nevertheless, compared to rich countries, they can 
thrive with a distinctly different institutional mix 
between markets and government than that which 
prevails in more-advanced countries. Because of the 
availability of catch-up growth, poor countries can 
reserve a larger role for government, as both market 
regulator and market participant, and still deliver 
excellent economic performance. In particular, the 
government can dominate decision-making over the 
large-scale allocation of capital—through state-owned 
enterprise, control over the financial sector, corporatist 
coordination, and industrial policy.
Consider the two great “miracles” of catch-up 
growth since World War II: first in western Europe 
and then (and still continuing) in East Asia. These 
two episodes are, at bottom, testaments to the 
astonishing productive power of market-based 
economic systems. Yet, in both cases, aggressively 
interventionist governments featured prominently, as 
well. Western Europe’s “mixed economy” or “social 
market economy” combined a large welfare state, state 
ownership of key industries, corporatist governance 
structures for industry with a prominent voice given to 
organized labor, and indicative government planning 
For much of the twentieth century, the possibility of 
catch-up growth fostered the widespread belief that 
markets could be largely or completely dispensed with 
and, indeed, were an impediment to progress.
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of investment. Meanwhile, in the so-called “Asian 
model” pioneered by Japan and later mimicked widely 
up and down the Pacific Rim, the welfare state was 
more modest and state ownership less pervasive, but 
here, too, governments exerted heavy influence over 
the allocation of resources through industrial policy and 
mercantilist export promotion. 
Notwithstanding their considerable successes 
(actually, precisely because of them), these systems 
of political economy eventually ran into trouble. 
Remember the old riddle about what a dog does 
when it catches the car it’s chasing? Countries face 
the same riddle when, after a sustained run of 
economic development, they get rich and approach 
the technological frontier. The challenge of continued 
growth now becomes very different. Work force growth 
slows down as populations continue to age. The payoffs 
to investments in mass schooling decline. Opportunities 
for rapid growth through borrowed technology begin 
to dissipate. To keep growth and prosperity going at 
the technological frontier, countries need to make the 
switch from imitation to innovation. They need to get 
better at pushing back the technological frontier on 
their own instead of relying on others to do it for them. 
No longer can policymakers peek ahead into the future; 
now they must grope in the dark of radical uncertainty. 
And, as Hayek recognized, the best way to deal with 
such uncertainty is by unleashing the trial-and-error 
experimentation of competition.
So, as countries get rich, they come under pressure 
to liberalize their economic systems. An innovative 
economy requires a different institutional mix than 
does an imitative economy. It needs more decentralized 
decision-making, more flexibility in the face of 
unforeseeable changes, and greater fertility in coming 
up with and trying out new ideas. Specifically, it needs a 
business environment in which entrepreneurial upstarts 
are free to compete and have good access to multiple 
and competing sources of funding. And getting there 
from here well may require heavy doses of privatization, 
deregulation of product markets, and liberalization of 
the financial sector.
This is precisely what has taken place in the 
advanced economies of Europe and Asia.14 In his 
detailed analysis of postwar Europe’s economic history, 
economist Barry Eichengreen explains how pressures 
for reform grew out of the changing requirements 
for growth. The early postwar decades, when Europe 
was playing catch-up with the United States, were a 
period of “extensive growth,” or “growth based on 
capital formation and the existing stock of technological 
knowledge.” By the 1970s, however, western Europe 
had entered the period of “intensive growth,” or 
“growth through innovation.”15 
That transition, Eichengreen argues, required 
fundamental and wrenching changes in the European 
economic system. “Increasingly, then, the same 
institutions of coordinated capitalism that had 
14. Note that the precise mechanism by which the changing requirements of growth lead to actual policy change is beyond the scope of this paper. For present purposes, I am 
content to point out two facts. First, faltering economic performance generates political pressure to enact pro-growth policies. This is so both because growth, high employment, 
and rising incomes are almost universally popular among electorates and because poor growth tends to cause mounting fiscal problems for governments. Second, in recent decades, 
there has actually been a great deal of market- and growth-friendly policy change around the world, generally catalyzed by poor economic performance and tightening fiscal 
constraints. How exactly these two dots are connected is a subject I hope to turn to in the future.
15. Barry Eichengreen, The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 6. Note that Eichengreen uses 
the terms extensive and intensive growth, respectively, in the same sense that I am using imitative and innovative growth.
to keep growth and prosperity going at the 
technological frontier, countries need to make the 
switch from imitation to innovation. they need to get 
better at pushing back the technological frontier on their 
own instead of relying on others to do it for them. 
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worked to Europe’s advantage in the age of extensive 
growth now posed obstacles to successful economic 
performance,” Eichengreen writes. “In this sense, the 
continent’s very success at exploiting the opportunities 
for catch-up and convergence after World War II 
doomed it to difficulties thereafter.”16 
Those difficulties have catalyzed far-reaching 
economic reforms. However halting and often 
insufficient these efforts have been in some countries, 
still the clear policy trend has been in the direction of 
privatization, tax-cutting, and deregulation. Among 
the members of the “EU-15” (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom), average government 
investment as a percentage of total investment has 
fallen from 28.8 percent in 1980 to 11.8 percent in 
2007, while the average top marginal income tax 
rate has dropped from 70.1 percent to 46.5 percent. 
Between 1995 and 2007, the average score on the 
World Bank’s rating for the ease of starting a business 
has improved from 5.7 (on a scale of one to ten) to 9.5 
(See Table 1).17 And, at least some countries—notably 
Denmark and the Netherlands—have made impressive 
strides in improving labor market flexibility, although 
  Year 1980 2007 1980 2007 1995 2007
  Austria 44.5 4.8 62.0 50.0 3.7 8.9
  Belgium 26.8 7.7 76.0 52.5 4.6 9.8
  Denmark 25.0 8.0 66.0 59.0 6.3 9.7
  Finland 23.3 11.1 68.0 51.5 8.5 9.5
  France 27.4 14.8 60.0 40.0 3.4 9.8
  Germany 25.7 8.2 65.0 47.0 5.0 9.2
  Greece 32.0 11.7 60.0 40.0 4.2 9.2
  Ireland 24.6 13.7 60.0 42.0 7.6 9.6
  Italy 25.9 11.0 72.0 44.0 4.1 9.5
  Luxembourg 22.0 19.0 N/A  39.0 7.0 9.0
  Netherlands 14.8 17.3 72.0 52.0 7.5 9.5
  Portugal 42.2 10.9 84.0 42.0 4.3 9.7
  Spain 27.1 12.0 66.0 43.0 5.3 8.3
  Sweden 41.2 16.9 87.0 55.5 5.1 9.4
  United Kingdom 29.1 10.1 83.0 40.0 8.1 9.6
  EU-15 Average 28.8 11.8 70.1 46.5 5.7 9.4
Source: Economic Freedom of the World: 2009 Annual Report.
Liberalization 
indicator
Government 
investment (%)
top marginal income 
tax Rate (%)
Ease of Starting a 
Business Rating 
(Scale:1–10)
table 1  
indicators of European Liberalization
16. Eichengreen, p. 7.
17. Data obtained from James Gwartney and Robert Lawson, Economic Freedom of the World: 2009 Annual Report (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2009).
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high unemployment benefits and barriers to firing 
workers remain the general rule.
Japan hit the same wall a decade or two later. In 
the 1980s, the country’s world-beating industries and 
impressive economic growth led many to proclaim 
that “Japan, Inc.” would soon replace the United 
States as the world’s economic superpower. Typical 
of the time were the sentiments of Clyde Prestowitz, 
author of the 1988 jeremiad Trading Places: How We 
are Giving Our Future to Japan and How to Reclaim It. 
“The power behind the Japanese juggernaut is much 
greater than most Americans suspect,” he wrote, “and 
the juggernaut cannot stop of its own volition, for 
Japan has created a kind of automatic wealth machine, 
perhaps the first since King Midas.”18 
Alas, the Japanese “wealth machine,” like poor 
King Midas, met an unhappy end. In Japan’s case, it 
was the bursting of the stock market and real estate 
bubbles and the ensuing “lost decade” of the 1990s. 
And so, less than a decade later, Prestowitz was forced 
to concede the limitations of the Japanese model. “As 
a catch-up machine, this model was unparalleled,” he 
wrote. “But, once Japan caught up ... problems began 
to arise. While the model was good at concentrating 
resources to hit targets already set by the pattern of 
Western development, it performed poorly at selecting 
new directions.”19 
The prolonged, post-bubble slump has brought 
mounting pressure for structural reforms. So far, this 
pressure has resulted in the “Big Bang” liberalization 
of financial markets, efforts to privatize Japan’s massive 
postal savings system, some unwinding of the keiretsu 
system of corporate cross-ownership, reform of large-
store regulation (designed to protect mom-and-pop 
retailers from big-box competition), and reduced 
barriers to inward foreign investment. To be sure, the 
pace of reform has been disappointingly slow—but the 
overall direction is clear enough. 
Understanding America’s 
Postwar “Golden Age”
And what about the United States? Like the other 
advanced countries it leads, and the rest of the world, 
as well, it, too, has moved in the direction of greater 
economic freedom over the course of recent decades. 
But why? After all, the United States thrived with 
distinctly less economic freedom in the decades after 
World War II, when it was already well established as 
the largest and most advanced economy on the planet. 
Since it has been at the technological frontier all this 
time, what was behind its shift to more entrepreneurial 
capitalism?
It turns out that, even at the vanguard of economic 
progress, opportunities for imitative growth were 
ample during the early postwar decades. Although the 
American economy considered as a whole occupied 
the technological frontier, whole regions of the country 
remained underdeveloped as the postwar boom began. 
Accordingly, there were significant opportunities for 
internal catch-up growth. In addition, the peculiar 
conditions of the time temporarily boosted the extent to 
which growth could rely on application of the existing 
stock of knowledge.
18. Clyde Prestowitz, Trading Places: How We are Giving Our Future to Japan and How to Reclaim It (New York: Basic Books, 1993 [1988]), p. 72.
19. Clyde Prestowitz, “Retooling Japan Is the Only Way to Rescue Asia Now,” Washington Post, December 14, 1997.
Alas, the Japanese “wealth machine,” like poor 
King midas, met an unhappy end. in Japan’s case, it was 
the bursting of the stock market and real estate bubbles 
and the ensuing “lost decade” of the 1990s.
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As of the end of World War II, America’s South 
and West lagged far behind the industrial heartland 
of the Northeast and Midwest. Dixie remained rural 
and backward, while the West was still largely empty. 
But, with the advent of air conditioning, interstate 
highways, and affordable air travel came the explosive 
growth of the “Sunbelt.” Florida, Texas, Arizona, and 
California led the way: Between 1940 and 1970, their 
combined population increased more than two-and-a-
half times, from 15.7 million to 39.7 million. In 1940, 
only three cities in the South and West—Los Angeles, 
San Francisco, and New Orleans—numbered among 
the nation’s top twenty largest cities. By 1970, nine 
cities—Los Angeles, Houston, Dallas, San Francisco, 
San Diego, San Antonio, Memphis, New Orleans, and 
Phoenix—made the cut. The attractions of the Sunbelt’s 
climate thus created lavish opportunities for economic 
growth without the need for any further technological 
or organizational breakthroughs.
Occurring at the same time as regional catch-up 
growth was another burst of imitative growth: the 
construction of suburbia. Between 1940 and 1970, 
the suburban population increased by nearly 65 million 
people and the homeownership rate soared from 44 
percent to 63 percent—a figure that then remained 
stable until the recent, unsustainable housing bubble.20 
Another opportunity for imitative growth came 
as a result of unique historical circumstances. Because 
the boom followed on the heels of two decades of 
depression and war, it profited from a big backlog of 
pent-up demand and supply. Consumers had long wish 
lists of purchases they had been forced to delay because 
of hard times or wartime rationing; meanwhile, for 
similar reasons, a host of new technologies had been 
developed but not yet commercialized. Working off 
this backlog can be seen as another form of catch-up 
growth: making up for lost time.
The combined effect of all these factors was a 
temporary lull in economic uncertainty. Building up the 
South and West, building out suburbia, bringing pent-
up supply to market and satisfying pent-up demand—
none of these contributors to the postwar boom 
required any significant extension of the technological 
frontier. As a result of these uniquely favorable 
circumstances, America experienced a so-called 
“Golden Age” of economic growth during the quarter 
century from 1948 to 1973 (See Table 2).
But the lull in uncertainty didn’t last. By the 1970s, 
the Sunbelt had risen, the migration to suburbia had 
largely played out, and the backlog of pent-up supply 
and demand had long been exhausted. And it’s no 
coincidence that, at just the same time, the Golden 
Age ended: U.S. productivity growth slumped and the 
economy succumbed to the blight of stagflation. The 
macroeconomic malaise then begat a policy response: 
the wholesale elimination of barriers to competition 
and entrepreneurship. Price and entry controls in the 
airline, trucking, and railroad industries were phased 
out. Oil and natural gas prices were deregulated. The 
AT&T monopoly was broken up, and competition in 
long-distance telephone services was permitted. Cable 
and satellite television were allowed to compete with 
broadcasting. Interest rates were deregulated, limits 
on branch banking were lifted, the wall between 
commercial and investment banking was lowered, and 
brokerage commissions became competitive. And tax 
rates were slashed: The top marginal rate for individuals 
plummeted from 70 percent in 1980 all the way to  
20. For statistics on the move to the suburbs, see Michael Elliott, The Day before Yesterday: Reconsidering America’s Past, Rediscovering the Present (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1996), p. 75.
By the 1970s, the Sunbelt had risen, the migration to 
suburbia had largely played out, and the backlog of 
pent-up supply and demand had long been exhausted. 
And it’s no coincidence that, at just the same time, the 
Golden Age ended: U.S. productivity growth slumped 
and the economy succumbed to the blight of stagflation. 
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28 percent in 1986, although it has drifted generally 
upward since then.
The turn toward entrepreneurial capitalism 
unleashed a quarter century of sustained growth: the 
so-called “Long Boom” of 1983–2008, interrupted by 
only eighteen months of mild recession and highlighted 
by the spectacular rise of personal computing and 
the Internet. But here’s a sobering fact: Despite the 
embrace of more market-friendly policies, the economic 
performance of the Long Boom could not match that 
of the Golden Age. Productivity growth, or the rise 
in output per hour worked, is perhaps the best single 
indicator of economic dynamism, as it is the ultimate 
foundation of rising living standards. By that measure, 
the dynamism of the early postwar decades was truly 
remarkable: Between 1947 and 1973, productivity 
rose at a brisk clip of 2.9 percent a year—the highest 
sustained rate in American economic history, and much 
better than the average annual growth of 2.0 percent 
between 1980 and 2006. Meanwhile, the prosperity 
generated by rising productivity was much more widely 
shared during the Golden Age. Back then, incomes at 
the bottom of the pay scale actually grew faster than 
Rank 1940 Population 1970 Population
 1 New York City 7,454,995 New York City 7,894,862
 2 Chicago 3,396,808 Chicago 3,366,957
 3 Philadelphia 1,931,334 Los Angeles 2,816,061
 4 Detroit 1,623,452 Philadelphia 1,948,609
 5 Los Angeles 1,504,277 Detroit 1,511,482
 6 Cleveland 878,336 Houston 1,232,802
 7 Baltimore 859,100 Baltimore 905,759
 8 St. Louis 816,048 Dallas 844,401
 9 Boston 770,816 Washington, D.C. 756,510
 10 Pittsburgh 671,659 Cleveland 750,903
 11 Washington, D.C. 663,091 Indianapolis 744,624
 12 San Francisco 634,536 Milwaukee 717,099
 13 Milwaukee 587,472 San Francisco 715,674
 14 Buffalo 575,901 San Diego 696,769
 15 new orleans 494,537 San Antonio 654,153
 16 Minneapolis 492,370 Boston 641,071
 17 Cincinnati 455,610 Memphis 623,530
 18 Newark 429,760 St. Louis 622,236
 19 Kansas City 399,178 new orleans 593,471
 20 Indianapolis 386,972  Phoenix 581,562
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
table 2  
twenty most Populous U.S. cities
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those at the top, so income gaps were narrowing. 
The situation was reversed during the Long Boom, as 
top earners far outpaced everybody else and income 
inequality has risen sharply.
These comparative statistics have resulted in 
lamentable, if understandable, confusion. Skeptics of 
free markets point to the good old days of muscular 
government involvement in economic affairs and argue 
that the turn toward greater competition has been 
a mistake. Paul Krugman, the Nobel Prize-winning 
economist and columnist for The New York Times, is 
perhaps the most prominent contemporary defender of 
the Golden Age’s model of political economy. “Basically, 
U.S. postwar economic history falls into two parts,” 
Krugman writes, “an era of high taxes on the rich and 
extensive regulation, during which living standards 
experienced extraordinary growth; and an era of low 
taxes on the rich and deregulation, during which living 
standards for most Americans rose fitfully at best.”21 
This beguiling analysis fails to reckon with the 
changing nature of economic growth.22 It is true that, 
all things being equal, better economic performance 
should result from better economic policies. But the fact 
is, all things are seldom equal. A country’s growth rate 
is the product not only of its policies and institutions, 
but of larger and exogenous circumstances, as well. If 
circumstances are exceptionally favorable for growth, 
even relatively poor policies and institutions can lead to 
excellent results. By comparison, if circumstances are 
more challenging, growth may be less impressive even 
with superb policies and institutions.
And that’s the key to the puzzle. With the 
exhaustion of relatively easy opportunities for imitative 
growth in the United States and other advanced 
economies, the prospects for growth became less 
favorable. Continued growth has had to rely more 
heavily on home-grown innovation, and innovation is 
harder than imitation. As the Red Queen told Alice, 
sometimes you have to run hard just to stay in place. 
And that’s the world we’ve been living in since the early 
1970s. So, even with improved economic policies, the 
United States—like other advanced economies—has 
been unable to match the strong growth record of the 
early postwar decades. 
But, contra Krugman, that falloff in performance 
does not constitute an indictment of the turn toward 
entrepreneurial capitalism. As economist Scott Sumner 
has observed, “Because economic growth slowed 
almost everywhere after 1973, however, we need to 
look at relative economic performance in order to 
identify the effect of neoliberal policy reforms.” Sumner 
examines Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, 
Japan, Singapore, Argentina, and Chile, comparing the 
ratios of their per-capita GDP figures to U.S. per-capita 
GDP in 1980, 1994, and 2008. And he finds that the 
degree to which those economies caught up with or 
fell further behind the United States over the course 
of this period matches up with the extent to which 
they undertook free-market reforms. “The relative 
performance of each of these economies,” Sumner 
concludes, “is consistent with the view that neoliberal 
policies promote economic growth”23 (See Table 3).
21. Paul Krugman, “Down the Memory Hole,” The New York Times, May 22, 2010.
22. For other flaws in Krugman’s historical analysis, see Brink Lindsey, “Paul Krugman’s Nostalgianomics: Economic Policies, Social Norms, and Income Inequality,” Cato Institute 
White Paper, February 9, 2009.
23. Scott Sumner, “The Unacknowledged Success of Neoliberalism,” Library of Economics and Liberty, July 5, 2010, http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2010/
Sumnerneoliberalism.html.
With the exhaustion of relatively easy opportunities 
for imitative growth in the United States and other 
advanced economies, the prospects for growth became 
less favorable. continued growth has had to rely more 
heavily on home-grown innovation, and innovation is 
harder than imitation.
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A new Frontier
The dwindling away of opportunities for robust 
imitative growth is not the only factor driving the 
United States and other advanced economies toward a 
more entrepreneurial version of capitalism. It’s not just 
that more and more economic activity is taking place 
near or at the technological frontier; in addition, the 
very nature of that frontier is changing. Simply put, the 
changing structure and output of advanced economies 
are making them progressively less amenable to 
centralized direction and control.
Modern economic development commonly is 
divided into two distinct phases. The first generally is 
known as industrialization or the industrial economy, 
but the second goes by a variety of labels. Some refer 
to the service economy, others call it the knowledge 
or information economy, while yet others play it close 
to the vest and speak simply of the postindustrial 
economy. For present purposes, I think it’s illuminating 
to refer to these two phases as the transition to mass 
affluence on the one hand and mass affluence itself on 
the other. Because that’s what industrialization is really 
all about: the transformation of a poor country into 
a rich country. In other words, the move from being 
a country in which most people have to struggle just 
to ensure their physical survival, to one in which most 
people take the fulfillment of their basic material needs 
for granted. In the one, biological imperatives dictate 
the main concerns of life, and choices are relatively few 
and clear cut; in the other, people are shielded from 
the harsh demands of nature by an immense edifice 
of technology and organization, and choices range far 
and wide among proliferating products of the human 
imagination.24 
 United States 1.000 1.000 1.000
 Australia 0.841 0.770 0.837
 Canada 0.905 0.818 0.843
 Britain 0.688 0.705 0.765
 Germany 0.803 0.812 0.763
 Italy 0.756 0.754 0.675
 Sweden 1.146 0.987 0.915
 Asia   
 Hong Kong 0.547 0.845 0.948
 Japan 0.732 0.815 0.736
 Singapore 0.577 0.899 1.064
 Latin America  
 Argentina 0.395 0.300 0.309
 Chile 0.210 0.251 0.311
Source: Sumner, “The Unacknowledged Success of Neoliberalism.”
country 1980 1994 2008
table 3  
income Per capita (PPP)  
as a Percentage of U.S. income Per capita
24. See Brink LIndsey, The Age of Abundance: How Prosperity Transformed America’s Politics and Culture (New York: Collins, 2007).
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The transition was made possible by the fusion 
of science, technology, and commerce—and, more 
specifically, by the complex of technologies and 
organizational innovations that enable mass production 
and mass distribution. During the transition, the 
central economic challenge was the development 
and servicing of mass markets for the staples of life: 
food, clothing, housing (including home furnishings 
and appliances), and transportation. The focus was on 
exploiting economies of scale by producing relatively 
homogeneous goods of middling quality and aimed at 
middling tastes.
As America’s postwar boom began to roar, though, 
the great transition had been accomplished. And once 
mass affluence had arrived, the nature of the economic 
challenge shifted—from mass markets to market 
segmentation. Wendell Smith coined that term in a 
1956 article in the Journal of Marketing. The problem 
for “many companies,” he noted, was that “their core 
markets have already been developed … to the point 
where additional advertising and selling expenditures 
[are] yielding diminishing returns.” The solution, he 
argued, was to start paying “attention to smaller 
or fringe market segments, which may have small 
potentials individually but are of crucial importance in 
the aggregate.”25 
And that’s the direction advanced capitalism has 
been following ever since—although, of course, it’s 
not a single direction, but countless different ones. 
As product varieties proliferated to suit every taste 
and social identity, what was being produced and 
consumed changed as, well. The richer we get, the 
more discretionary our purchases become. According 
to Nobel Prize-winning economic historian Robert 
Fogel, 74 percent of U.S. consumption went to food, 
clothing, and shelter back in 1875, at the outset of 
25. Quoted in Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), p. 295.
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the transition to affluence. As of 1995, that share 
had fallen to 13 percent26 (See Figure 2). Also, our 
consumption choices shift toward the intangible as we 
accumulate more and more stuff: We look to buy good 
experiences rather than another thing to gather dust. 
Between 1950 and 2000, the share of total personal 
consumption expenditures on physical goods declined 
from 67 percent to 42 percent, while the share spent on 
intangible services rose from 33 percent to  
58 percent.27 
The arrival of mass affluence and the move beyond 
mass markets made the path of economic progress even 
more unpredictable than before. What new products 
would people actually want to buy? What nuances of 
function or design or marketing would separate big 
sellers from duds? During the industrial era, it was 
possible to identify mass markets that weren’t yet fully 
saturated and know with reasonable certainty that 
the future would bring the further expansion of those 
markets. Now, though, the future is more obscure  
than ever. 
So far I’ve been focusing on how mass affluence 
heightens uncertainty on the demand side. That is, 
as basic material needs are satisfied, the question of 
what new products, or product improvements, actually 
will result in higher consumer satisfaction becomes 
increasingly subjective and unpredictable. At the same 
time, though, the advance of the technological frontier 
ramps up uncertainty on the supply side, as well. 
First of all, the richer and more advanced our 
economies become, the more we are deluged with 
new knowledge and information. Economic and 
knowledge growth are intimately interrelated: The 
former simultaneously feeds off of and stimulates the 
latter. It is, therefore, no coincidence that the era of 
modern economic growth, which began around 1800, 
has been characterized by the exponential growth of 
knowledge. According to a landmark study by physicist 
and science historian Derek Price back in 1961, the 
number of scientific journals—which serves as a proxy 
for the volume of significant scientific findings—has 
been doubling every fifteen years or so since the late 
eighteenth century.28 As the economist Paul Romer 
conjectures, “It may be inherent in the process of 
discovery that the more we learn the faster we can 
learn. It’s a notion that was captured by Newton when 
he said that he could see farther because he stood on 
the shoulders of giants.”29 
Meanwhile, thanks to revolutionary developments 
in information technologies, the amount of new usable 
data generated every year has attained mind-boggling 
proportions—and it’s growing rapidly. According to a 
study by economists Peter Lyman and Hal Varian, the 
total production of new information stored on paper, 
film, and magnetic and optical media came to roughly 
five trillion megabytes in 2002—or the equivalent 
of 37,000 book collections as big as the Library of 
Congress. Some 92 percent of these data were stored 
on magnetic media, mainly hard disks; only a paltry 
0.01 percent were stored on paper. Furthermore, they 
found that the volume of new information produced in 
a year had basically doubled over a three-year period—
an annual growth rate of 66 percent.30 The Information 
Age, indeed. 
What does all of this have to do with economic 
uncertainty? The explosion of new ideas and new 
information means an equivalent explosion in the 
possible new avenues for economic progress. Which will 
lead to new products and whole new industries, and 
which will peter out in dead ends? Nobody knows. And 
the more possible futures we can imagine, the more 
mysterious the real future becomes.
Paradoxically, even as knowledge and information 
grow more plentiful, innovation apparently is growing 
more difficult.31 Consider the fact that the number 
of scientists and researchers has exploded over the 
course of the past century—without any corresponding 
acceleration in growth or innovation. Benjamin Jones, 
26. Robert William Fogel, The Escape from Hunger and Premature Death, 1700–2100: Europe, America, and the Third World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 89. 
Note that Fogel’s calculations include consumption of leisure through the reduction of working hours.
27. Historical Statistics, Series F, 47–59, p. 229; 2004-5 SA Table 641.
28. Derek Price, Science since Babylon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).
29. Quoted in Arnold Kling and Nick Schulz, From Poverty to Prosperity: Intangible Assets, Hidden Liabilities, and the Lasting Triumph over Scarcity (New York: Encounter Books, 
2009), p. 80.
30. Peter Lyman and Hal Varian, “How Much Information? 2003,” http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-2003/.
31. This paragraph, added just before this paper went to press, owes an obvious debt to Tyler Cowen’s provocative new book, The Great Stagnation.
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an economist at Northwestern University, hypothesizes 
that the culprit is what he calls a growing “knowledge 
burden”: As the total sum of knowledge grows, it 
takes longer and longer for a person to learn enough 
to make any additional contribution. He thus sees the 
darker side of that Newton quotation mentioned by 
Paul Romer above: If one is to stand on the shoulders 
of giants, one must first climb up their backs, and the 
greater the body of knowledge, the harder this climb 
becomes.32 Paul Segerstrom of the Stockholm School 
of Economics suggests an alternative explanation: The 
stock of truly welfare-enhancing ideas is running down. 
“In each industry the most obvious ideas are discovered 
first,” he writes, “making it harder to find new ideas 
subsequently.”33 Citing the work of Segerstrom 
and others, Tyler Cowen recently has made waves 
by claiming that we have reached a “technological 
plateau.”34 
Whether or not Cowen’s gloomy assessment is 
correct, the growing difficulty of innovation compounds 
the uncertainty of the economic future even further. 
Not only is the amount of information to be sifted 
through for new ideas with commercial potential 
growing by leaps and bounds, but possibly the supply 
of good but undiscovered ideas is beginning to peter 
out. The haystacks are multiplying while the needles 
may be getting scarcer.
Deepening uncertainty on the supply side extends 
not only to new ideas for new products and production 
processes, but also to who the leading producers 
will be. Over the course of the transition to mass 
affluence, large economies of scale figured prominently 
in shaping the structures of firms and industries. As a 
consequence, average firm size tended to grow while 
rates of entrepreneurship fell throughout the most 
advanced economies.35 Barriers to entry created by 
the high returns to scale led to a relative muting of 
competitive intensity in a host of leading industries.
With the arrival of mass affluence and the 
emergence of the postindustrial, information economy, 
returns to scale—and barriers to entry—began to 
fall. Numerous studies have confirmed a general and 
persistent trend in rich countries: Starting in the 1970s, 
the average size of firms has shrunk substantially, while 
self-employment and business ownership rates (proxies 
for entrepreneurship) have posted modest gains.36 
Meanwhile, competitive dominance—at least in the 
United States—has grown increasingly precarious. 
According to one study, the chances that a company in 
the top 20 percent of firms in an industry (as measured 
by market capitalization) will fall out of that elite group 
over the next five years increased fivefold between 
1960 and 2000.37 In a similar vein, the average annual 
turnover in the Fortune 500 between 1985 and 2005 
32. Benjamin F. Jones, “The Burden of Knowledge and the Death of the Renaissance Man: Is Innovation Getting Harder?” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 76, No. 1, January 2009, 
pp. 283–317.
33. Paul S. Segerstrom, “Endogenous Growth without Scale Effects,” American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 5, December 1998, pp. 1290–1310.
34. Cowen, The Great Stagnation.
35. See, e.g., Sander Wennekers, André van Stel, Martin Carree, and Roy Thurik, “The relationship between entrepreneurship and economic development: Is it U-shaped?” SCALES 
research report, April 2010, http://www.entrepreneurship-sme.eu/pdf-ez/H200824.pdf.
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According to a study by economists Peter Lyman and 
Hal Varian, the total production of new information 
stored on paper, film, and magnetic and optical media 
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Library of congress.
Kauffman Foundation Research Series on Dynamics of Economic Growth
Frontier Economics: Why Entrepreneurial Capitalism Is Needed Now More Than Ever
[17]
A
 N
E
W
 F
R
O
N
T
IE
R
was more than 40 percent higher than that between 
1955 and 197538 (See Figure 3).
Some of this surge in competitive intensity reflects 
the changes in the policy environment noted earlier. In 
addition, though, market factors have played a major 
role. Scale economies always were less important in 
the service sector than in manufacturing, so the steady 
relative growth of the service economy has served to 
promote the overall decrease in firm size (although that 
decrease has been occurring within manufacturing, as 
well). The progress of economic development globally, 
combined with falling transportation costs—in other 
words, globalization—has reduced market power by 
making producers anywhere ever more vulnerable to 
competitors everywhere. Likewise, the development and 
deepening of financial markets have reduced barriers 
to entry by giving upstarts improved access to the 
capital they need to challenge incumbent firms. And the 
spectacular advance of information technologies has 
made major contributions to the shift from oligopolistic 
to more entrepreneurial capitalism. First, research shows 
that increased IT investment leads to smaller firms, by 
automating what had previously been labor-intensive 
clerical work and by reducing the transaction costs 
associated with using outside suppliers and, thereby, 
encouraging vertical specialization.39 Also, by facilitating 
the bringing together of buyers and sellers, IT reduces 
barriers to entry and encourages the emergence of 
“long tail” niche markets.40 
Reduced market barriers to entry make government 
efforts to direct the course of economic development 
increasingly problematic. Such efforts typically take the 
form of funneling resources to existing producers—
through directed credit, restrictions on competition, or 
38. Calculations by the Kauffman Foundation. Note that the turnover between 1994 and 1995 was excluded because in 1995 Fortune changed its methodology to include firms in 
the service sector.
39. See Erik Brynjolfsson, Thomas W. Malone, Vijay Gurbaxani, and Ajit Kambil, “Does Information Technology Lead to Smaller Firms?” Management Science, Vol. 40, No. 12, 
December 1994, pp. 1628–1644.
40. See Chris Anderson, The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business Is Selling Less of More (New York: Hyperion, 2006).
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outright subsidies. When market conditions are such 
that the identity of leading producers in a given industry 
is fairly stable even without government intervention, 
the effect of such intervention can be relatively benign. 
Basically, what government does in these situations is 
to augment and accelerate investments that would be 
going on anyway.
When, however, the marketplace is considerably 
more dynamic, the risk grows that government 
intervention will back the wrong horse—in particular, 
by propping up incumbent firms and thwarting the 
emergence of new firms with new and better ways of 
doing things. And the opportunity costs of backing the 
wrong horse go up, as well, as the possible trajectories 
of industries with and without intervention grow 
increasingly divergent. Economist Scott Sumner puts 
the matter succinctly: “If all you have to do is churn out 
iron and steel and washing machines and apartment 
buildings, it can be done passably well with central 
planning ... [but not] when the decisions were about 
whether to allocate capital to Google or Genzyme, 
or whether to build that auto parts plant in Detroit or 
Mexico or China. It’s no longer about simply mobilizing 
capital to mass produce clearly defined output of stuff 
we all know consumers will want.”41 
conclusion
What public policies deliver economic growth? 
There are few questions of greater importance, but 
the frustrating and confusing answer is: It depends. 
Institutions and governance are capable of yielding 
robust growth in one setting, only to produce 
dysfunction and disappointment elsewhere. This leads, 
again and again, to misconstruing another country’s 
successes, or the successes of a country’s own past, 
as a model that can be applied under very different 
circumstances.
But all is not a hopeless muddle. The key to 
breaking through the confusion and misunderstanding 
is to recognize that the policy requirements for 
economic growth are a function of a country’s relative 
and absolute levels of economic development. At 
lower levels of economic development, the relatively 
centralized economic decision-making that results 
from more interventionist government can work 
fairly well. Indeed, direct government intervention 
in markets even may serve to accelerate economic 
progress under certain circumstances. But, at higher 
levels of development, there is simply no substitute 
for the robust competition and perpetually unsettling 
dynamism of entrepreneurial capitalism.
When an economy is operating well behind the 
technological frontier, or has reached the frontier only 
unevenly, it faces plentiful opportunities for imitative 
growth—the low-hanging fruit of economic progress. 
Likewise, during the process of industrialization—or, 
to put it another way, during the transition to mass 
affluence—the primary thrust of economic growth is 
41. Scott Sumner, “Invisible Martians and Occam’s Razor,” The Money Illusion, January 3, 2011, http://www.themoneyillusion.com/?p=8289.
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aimed at the efficient fulfillment of basic human needs 
through mass production and mass distribution. Both 
when economic development is at a relatively low level 
(behind the technological frontier), or when it is still 
at an absolutely low level (still transitioning from mass 
poverty to mass affluence), the uncertainty of economic 
life is thus at a relatively low ebb. But, as an economy 
approaches the technological frontier, and as successful 
industrialization ushers in mass affluence, increasing 
uncertainty about how best to advance consumer 
welfare requires incessant, extensive trial and error to 
plot a viable path forward. This requires, in turn, an 
institutional and policy environment that gives free rein 
to entrepreneurship and competition.
Armed with the insights of “frontier economics,” 
it is easy to see what went wrong with those bold 
forecasts that the 2008 financial crisis would provoke a 
worldwide shift away from free markets. Quite simply, 
we’re a long way from the 1930s. Back then, when the 
world was much poorer than it is today—and when, as 
well, economic policies in many countries were more 
hands-off —it was possible for governments to expand 
significantly their involvement in economic affairs in a 
way that was consistent with (even if not necessary or 
even good for) the eventual resumption of growth and 
prosperity. Certainly that was the case in the United 
States, as the postwar boom of the Golden Age amply 
testifies.
Things are very different today. The poorly 
understood, but vitally important, fact of the matter is 
that there is a ratchet effect in the relationship between 
economic policies and economic performance. The 
richer we get, the more we rely on innovation to keep 
growth going—and, therefore, the more we need 
free-market policies that foster the creation of new 
businesses and the implementation of new ideas. If 
we are to rise out of the current slump and launch a 
new, twenty-first-century boom, it is in the direction of 
freer, more competitive markets that our policies must 
turn. However well they worked in the past, neither 
the specific policies nor the general style of governance 
from the Golden Age are viable options today. The past 
is gone, and we can never go back.
the richer we get, the more we rely on innovation to 
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